The Prices and Incomes Commission in Retrospect by Anton, F. R.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"The Prices and Incomes Commission in Retrospect"
 
F. R. Anton
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 28, n° 3, 1973, p. 457-475.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/028416ar
DOI: 10.7202/028416ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 01:29
The Priées and Incomes 
Commission in Retrospect 
Frank R. Anton 
In this article, the author reviews the Canadian Priées 
and Incomes Commission's findings and comments on some 
of the conclusions drawn. 
The Priées and Incomes Commission was appointed by Order-dn-
Council in June 1969 with tenns of référence 
to inquire into and report upon the causes, processes and conséquences 
of inflation and to inform those making current price and income déci-
sions, the gênerai public and the Government on how price stability 
may best be achieved. 
The décision to appoint a Commission followed from the 1968 White 
Paper, « Policies for Price Stability », in which the Government had 
concluded that the conventional means available to it for influencing the 
opération of the Canadian economy were insufficient to résolve the conflict 
between maintaining high level employment and restoring the price sta-
bility neoessary for sustained économie growth. After about 3 years in 
opération the Commission petered out to the relief, it is said, of the 
Canadian Labour Congress(CLC) and to a lesser extent business interests 
throughout the land. 
The purpose of this article is (1) to review the Commission's findings 
on the basis of its Summary Reportl and research studies prepared in 
the course of its investigations and (2) to comment on some of the con-
clusions drawn. 
Given the breadth of the Com-
mission's terms of référence « to 
ANTON, F.R., Ph.D. (London), Pro-
fessor, University of Calgary, Al-
berta. 
1
 Inflation, Unemployment and Incomes Policy, Summary Report, Priées and 
Incomes Commission, Information Canada, Ottawa, 1972. 
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inquire in to . . . the causes, processes and conséquences of inflation... » 
it chose wisely to interpret its task more narrowly by seeking to explain 
(1) why in récent years inflation has persisted under conditions 
ordinarily thought to indicate an absence of strong demand 
pressure on the economy and 
(2) what form of priées and incomes policy — if any — might be 
helpful in attempting to deal with the problem. 
The question raised in ( 1 ) above is not confined to Canada alone ; 
no satisfactory answer to it has yet been provided. Nevertheless the 
Commission attempted to give an explanation, within the Canadian context, 
by rigourously analysing the conventional causes of inflation. It concluded 
that the main factor which initiated the relatively rapid increase of priées 
and costs in Canada in the mid-1960's was a build-up of unusually strong 
demand pressure on the economy's productive capacity and rnanpower 
resources. This surge of demand was export led (resulting from the re-
pegging of the Canadian dollar exchange rate in 1962 at a substantially 
reduced level) and when it was followed by an increase in business in-
vestment and residential construction, culminating in a sharp rise in 
government expenditures (as the authorities responded to public mood 
and social pressures via expansionary and monetary policies) the way 
was paved for an overshoot in demand. By 1968 inflation was deeply 
entrenched and it appeared that « no conceivable way of managing demand 
remained open to the authorities for which public understanding or 
approval could be expected » 2. To protect employment levels would hâve 
meant acoepting as the new minimum the escalated rate of inflation which 
had emerged whereas moderating demand growth, in order to restore 
some degree of priée stability, would hâve meant risking a highi level of 
unemployment. Given this quandary the government hopefully sought 
a way out of it by establishing the Commission. 
THE CHOICES FOR POLICY 
Given the spécial nature of the problem of inflation coupled with 
high unemployment3 the Commission, in ligh-t of its analyses and findings, 
2
 Ibid., p. 2. The Commission explains the persistence of inflation mainly 
in terms of lags in the response of costs and priées to short-run changes in demand 
and to « inflationary expectations ». 
3
 There are several characteristics of our économie structure and labor markets 
which account for this. Among thèse are the unusually large percentage of young 
people in the labor market, the seasonality of employment, the high rate of job-
turnover and the persistance of régional disparities in levels of employment. 
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discusses the policy choices which were open to Canada at that time. 
One obvious possibility was to accept, and learn to tolerate, a certain 
degree of inflation as the price for keeping the level of unemployment 
within reasonable bounds. But this choice was unlikely to be acceptable 
to the authorities because of the successive and progressive^ higher rates 
of inflation required. The authorities could therefore fall back on the 
alternative of following the conventional kind of « stop-go » policies in 
which any short-run employment and output gains associated with an 
inflationary outbreak had to be balanced not only against the redistribution 
and other adverse effects of unanticipated inflation, but also against the 
losses of output and employment and the associated distortions entailed 
in reversing the process4. In the Commission's view this latter kind of 
policy was not likely to yield a net gain to society, and even if we learned 
to live with the occasional bursts of inflation there was no assurance that 
the national average rate of unemployment would be any lower than that 
which had prevailed since the mid-1950's. The possibility remained of 
reducing the critical range of unemployment (at which cost and price 
increases tend to accelerate) by using manpower, régional économie ex-
pansion, sélective demand, tariff and compétitive policies to better effect. 
For instance, had the government sought actively to match labor supply 
more appropriately with demand, by fostering domestic compétition through 
the lowering or abolition of tariffs and by removing restrictive trade and 
labor practices, the critical range of unemployment could hâve been 
lowered. But as the Commission notes, there was the possibility (as yet 
undocumented) that some of thèse policies might be rendered counter-
productive by influences which could inadvertently widen the range of 
unemployment. Institutional and political forces might operate in this 
direction as could higher unemployment insurance and welfare benefits, 
increases in légal minimum wages and changing attitudes (especially among 
the 18-24 year âge group) towards the work ethic. Caution was therefore 
urged in assuming that the critical range of national unemployment could 
be easily and speedily reduced5. Thus with more rapid inflation ruled 
out as unacceptable and the considérable limitations of supply and sélective 
demand policies recognized, the authorities appeared to be left with two 
remaining policy instruments for dealing with the problem : 
4 Ibid., p. 6. 
5 Ibid., p. 40. 
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(1) gênerai demand management, and 
(2) incomes policy. 
General Demand Management 
Given the thesis that inflation in Canada from the mid-1960's 
onwards was caused primarily by an overshoot of demand, the question 
arises : Is there an inhérent conflict between the way demand would 
hâve to be managed (a) to keep unemployment to an acceptable minimum 
and (b) to achieve reasonable price stability ? Most economists accept 
the thesis that there is a « trade-off » between reducing the average level 
of unemployment, and accepting a higher average rate of price increase. 
Some, however, assert that society has no choice but to learn to live with 
a degree of continuous inflation, while others argue that appropriate 
demand management will résolve the problem. Recently convincing évi-
dence has been accumulated that the trade-off options (based on past 
expérience) hâve been worsening, in the sensé that if the authorities aim 
at keeping unemployment down to an acceptable level then the rate of 
inflation is likely to increase at a more rapid rate than in the past6. This 
phenomenon, in the Commission^ view may be partly accounted for by 
the theory that unanticipated inflation tends to become transformed into 
anticipated inflation whereby people anticipate future rates of inflation 
and adjust their transactions accordingly 7. But to try to keep the level of 
unemployment down by allowing inflation to accelerate may be fraught 
with danger ; some readers may recall Hayek's warning that sooiety may 
hâve a tiger by the tail if it keeps on attempting to lower unem]3loyment 
in this way. Those who advocate keeping unemployment down at the cost 
of sacrificing reasonable price stability must, according to the Commission, 
remember that the short term gains in output and employment generated 
should be balanced against the random redistribution of income and 
wealth, the possibility of social unrest, the disruption of markets dealing 
in fixed value assets and the waste of people's time and effort in devising 
ways to protect themselves against this kind of inflation. Moreover, it 
6 See, S.F. KALISKI, The Trade-Off Between Inflation and Unemployment : 
Some Explorations of the Récent Evidence for ^Canada, Economie Couneil of Ca-
nada, Spécial Study No. 22, Ottawa, 1972. 
7
 Prolonged inflation may hâve strengthened the trend towards pattern setting 
not only in wages but also in priées (and perhaps interest rates) to the extent that 
labor and management may build in an « inflation factor » into their wage and 
price décisions. 
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may be invalid to assume, for Canada at any rate, a one-way movement 
in price and cost increases without the need for corrective action to remedy, 
for instance, the probable crises which might arise in the balance of inter-
national payments. And while it may be correct that inflation in Canada 
is of little conséquence so long as the rate of inflation in this country keeps 
in step with the rate prevailing among our major trading partners, it would, 
in the Commission's view, be folly to ignore the undeniably damaging 
effects inflation can cause, particularly if it is allowed to degenerate into 
the accelerating kind8. 
Those who argue that inflation is a fesser evil than unemployment 
see the latter (especially among the lower income group) as immoral and 
wasteful of resources. The Commission agrées that unemployment is 
wasteful and immoral but asserts that there is the risk that inflationary 
policies may succeed in maintaining output and employment only to the 
extent that people are unaware of (or are misled by) what is happening 
to the purchasing power of money. Some récent évidence from the col-
lective bargaining table suggests that the era of the « money illusion » 
may well be over. A cost of living escalation clause is becoming a common 
prerequisite for an acceptable agreement and if such provisos become 
widespread they are likely to add impetus to inflation. The Commission 
concludes that the arguments in support of inflation sound superficially 
convincing when cast in the light of the immorality of unemployment but 
on reflection acceptance of accelerated rates of price-cost rises and the 
inhérent danger of social unrest which may follow suggest the need for 
investigating and experimenting with such an alternative as an incomes 
policy which when coupled with appropriate demand management and 
manpower policies may enable the government to achieve its aims. 
Manpower Policy 
Apart from demand management as a means of reducing unemploy-
ment and maintaining a steady rate of économie growth référence is 
frequently made to the need for, and efficacy of, appropriate manpower 
policies as a complément to the above as an aid to stabilizing cost and 
prices. The Commission is correct in asserting that many of the spécifie 
labor market imbalanoes which exist in Canada could be removed by 
manpower policies such as more widespread training programs, an im-
8
 F. BLACKABY, National Institute Economie Review, Nov. 1971, p. 38. Infla-
tion, says the author, is a method by which the able-bodied rob the aged. 
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proved flow of information, and better counselling and placement ser-
vices ; ail will aid the labor supply to adjust more effectively to emerging 
demand. But unless régional unemployment differentials are successfully 
and simultaneously reduced — either through greater labor mobility out 
of high unemployment areas or by déviées to stimulate job création within 
thèse areas — such policies are likely to be only partially successful. A 
concerted federal-provincial attack on this disturbing problem of régional 
disparities would lead to substantial improvement and bring large économie 
and social gains. For example, it is argued that through the use of budget-
ary policy much more could be done by way of régional économie expansion 
programs (i.e. bringing jobs to workers rather than workers to the jobs), 
sélective demand policies (i.e. stimulating demand in under-utilized in-
dustries or régions while avoiding excess demand pressure in industries 
operating at capacity), and via the stabilizing of demand over time 
especially in highly volatile industries such as construction (i.e. by im-
proving the flow of information on future construction plans). Similarly, 
a more realistie approach should be taken to the réduction or abolition of 
tariffs and the abandonment of price support programs and restrictive 
trade and labor practices. And while those who emphasize this latter 
approach lean towards a cost-push or « market power » explanation of 
inflation, (a view which receives little support from the Commission) 9 
clearly several alternatives are available ail of which may hâve bénéficiai 
effects and yield tangible results. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF DEMAND POLICIES ? 
Effective demand management policy is in the Commission's view 
crucial to the smooth functioning of an economy. But in light of Canada's 
record it is questioned whether conventional policies alone can do the 
job adequately (providing the authorities adopt the appropriate rules of 
behaviour) or whether thèse should be supplemented by other measures 
such as an incomes policy ? Those who maintain that conventional demand 
policies can fulfil the task adequately generally assert that the « trade-
off » between unemployment and inflation is essentially a short-
run phenomenon arising from instability in the rate of expansion of 
money demand. They see changes in demand pressure on productive 
9
 The Commission's empirical évidence lent no support to the view that unions 
and corporations were responsible for the inflation of that period although it ack-
nowledged that there was scope for both parties to use their discrétion in wage-
price setting. 
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capacity having an immédiate yet temporary effect on output and em-
ployment levels (because of the delayed response of costs and prices to 
such changes), but ultimately costs and prices adjust to the trend of 
money demand. Thus by keeping the growth of money demand stable 
reasonable levels of économie growth and employment will be achieved 
around rates determined by the level of capital formation, and by growth 
in the labor force and national productivity. Any differential arising between 
the growth rate of money demand and productivity, will be reflected as 
inflation but flexible exchange rates can offset differential changes in 
domestic prices vis-à-vis priée levels in other countries. Moreover, any 
unemployment emerging under conventional policies is not the resuit of 
demand deficiency but rather reflects a lack of effective business com-
pétition, and institutional rigidities and characteristics of the labor and 
market products. Consequently, to reduce unemployment their solution is 
to make the economy more compétitive. 
It is clear that those who favour conventional demand management 
see the overriding aim of such policies as the most effective (perhaps sole) 
means of stabilizing demand growth at a near full employment level 
consistent with reasonable price stability. The potential for reducing any 
structural unemployment which may arise must therefore dépend on the 
scope the authorities hâve for implementing policies to improve the efficacy 
with which labor and product markets perform. 
The above solution has strong appeal on analytical and doctrinal 
grounds but the Commission poses the fondamental question : how can 
such policies be made to function effectively in practice ? Not only can 
demand instability arise from sudden or substantial changes in fiscal, 
monetary or exchange rate policies but it can also occur because of other 
influences among which are major changes in demand abroad, severe 
fluctuations in the exchange rate, industrial strife or social disturbances. 
The construction of sophisticated long-term econometric models of the 
economy may help to throw light on how better to regulate activity but 
to judge from the record, demand management must continue to rely 
mainly on short-term économie forecasts. No doubt in time économie 
fluctuations will be reduced as the controversies surrounding « the relative 
importance of monetary and fiscal measures, the timing and magnitude 
of their effect s, the conséquences of alternative exchange rate policies and 
a host of lesser questions...10 » are resolved but it would be unrealistic 
10
 Summary Report, op. cit., p. 45. 
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to underrate the purely technical difficulties which must still be overcome. 
And as the Commission rightly observes, given the continuing public 
pressure to use today's policies to deal with présent difficulties, reliance on 
conventional demand management policies alone is unlikely to yield accep-
table results. 
It is easy in retrospect for the Commission to argue that if expansion 
in aggregate demand had not been allowed to become too strong (parti-
cularly after price and wage levels began to rise appreciably after 1964) 
and the growth of money demand had been kept within the range of 
seven or eight per cent a year (to keep pace with the trend rate of growth 
in the labor force and average productivity) the demand overshoot of the 
mid-1960's could hâve been avoided. But économie policy-makers (even 
when they are right) are subject to the vagaries of political persuasion 
thus any contraction in demand would probably hâve been opposed by 
the public then, as now, in view of the widespread belief that the economy 
could be manipulated to operate at unemployment levels of, say, less than 
five per cent without generating unreasonable price and cost increases. 
It is generally accepted in Canada that price, wage and unemployment 
trends are progressively linked to those prevailing in the U.S. n. In the 
Commission's opinion had an attempt been made to deviate from this norm 
in the mid-1960's then fixed parity of exchange rates would hâve had to 
give way to a floating exchange rate, to insulate the economy from the 
strong inflationary pressures which developed in the U.S. (particularly 
after the Kennedy wage-price guidelines were abandoned in 1965). But 
for a number of reasons the authorities chose not to allow the dollar to 
float and in any event it is unlikely that there would hâve been public 
support for the higher unemployment levels which floating might hâve 
brought. 
By late 1968 with inflation entrenched in public expectations and 
behaviour there was no conventional way of managing demand which the 
public would hâve understood or approved. n Stabilizing money demand 
11
 On the basis of the évidence, the Commission concluded that over the 
longer run there was some support for the assertion that inflation in Canada was 
imported ; this was particularly évident when the rate of exchange of the Canadian 
dollar was maintained at a fixed level. But in the short run, rising U.S. costs and 
priées were only one of a number of factors influencing cost-price trends hère. 
Ibid., p. 16. 
12 Ibid., p. 2. 
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at a high enough rate to minimize any temporary rise in unemployment 
would hâve implied acceptanee of the inflation which had been in évidence 
since 1966. The alternative therefore was to try to stabilize demand growth 
at a rate low enough to restore cost and price stability while temporarily 
accepting a rise in unemployment. The government chose this latter and 
unpopular alternative. The rate of inflation was slowed down markedly 
but inadvertently unemployment rose to near record levels. In light of 
this relatively récent expérience of demand management the Commission 
realistically concludes that it would seem unwise to pin great hopes on 
what might be achieved towards resolving the inflation-unemployment 
dilemma in the years ahead. And while it sees demand management offering 
the best available hope of resolving the dilemma over the longer run (par-
ticulafly when coupled with considérable improvements in techniques) it 
is concluded that reliance on this policy alone is unlikely to enable the 
authorities to achieve their stated objectives. It is for this reason that the 
occasional and temporary assistance of an incomes policy becomes worthy 
of considération. 
AN INCOMES POLICY FOR CANADA ? 
Despite the foregoing analyses, and the examples set by the U.S.,U.K. 
and several West European countries it appears to this reviewer that the 
Commission had some noticable réservations about the efficacy of an 
incomes policy as a complément to demand management in stabilizing 
costs and priées at an acceptable level of employment. That opposition 
to such a policy on the part of the unions and many académie economists 
was vociferous and persistent is well recognized. This fact coupled with 
Dr. John Young's courageous attempts (often in an inhospitable atmo-
sphère) to win support throughout the country for the voluntary six per 
cent wage guideline may account for the implicit lack of conviction with 
which the Commission summarized its case in support of such a policy. 
It is acknowledged that the chances of success were limited, since it held 
the view that the place of « voluntarism » in a price and income restraint 
program should be largely restricted to agreement in criteria to be followed 
but that when it came to applying criteria a means of enforcement was 
required. 13 
Moreover, the Report states, for example, that a degree of realism 
is clearly required « . . . in assessing the potential usefulness of some form 
13 ibid., p. 55. 
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of incomes policy, particularly since many supporters of direct intervention 
in wage and price décisions under-estimate the difficulties in applying 
such a policy and over-estimate the results which might be achieved. » 14 
As it turned out attempts by the authorities to extricate the economy 
from the inflation generated by an overshoot of demand (and persistent 
inflationary expectations and response lags) resulted in unacceptably 
high levels of extented unemployment, whereas resort to temporary controls 
similar to those subsequently imposed in the U.S. might hâve offered a 
means of bringing cost and price increases more promptly and reliably 
into Une with the change in demand conditions, without inourring the loss 
of jobs and output normally associated with the adjustment process in 
bringing inflation under control by conventional means. 
It is generally agreed that the essential conditions for a successful 
(temporary) incomes policy are public acceptance of it and government 
résolve to maintain relative price stability and reasonably full employment 
— even after controls are ilifted. 
The model incomes policy which the Commission had in mind for 
Canada was similar to that under discussion at the time in the U.S. and 
which was subsequently introduced there in 1971.15 The rational given by 
the U.S. authorities for their policy was that : 
The basic premise of the price-wage control system is that the inflation 
of 1970 and 1971 was the resuit of expectations, contracts, and patterns 
of behaviour built up during the earlier period, beginning in 1965, 
when there was an inflationary excess of demand. Since there is no 
14 Ibid., p. 47. 
15
 The salient features of this policy were : Phase 1 : August 15, 1971-Novem-
ber 14, 1971 — Three-month freeze of priées, rents, wages and salaries, administer-
ed by a new Cost of Living Council under the Secretary of the Treasury. Phase 2 : 
November 14, 1971-January 11, 1973 — Guidelines for pay of, initially 5V£% a 
year; for priées across the economy of 2x/2% a year. Voluntary limitations on 
dividend increases. Overall aim : to reduce inflation to 2%-3% by end-1972. Ma-
chinery : Cost of Living Council to be in charge generally, Price Commission and 
Pay Board to make detailed décisions, Internai Revenue to monitor and enforce 
policy. Phase 3 : January 11, 1973 — ? — Statutory controls abolished, except 
on food, health care and building. Guidelines : to limit overall inflation to 2Vi%, 
wages to 5V£%, priées to V/i%. After a signal failure to get anywhere near thèse 
targets, re-introduction from May lst of pre-notification of price increase for large 
companies. The 600-odd firms with sales of more than $250m a year again hâve 
to advise the Cost of Living Council of any planned price increase exceeding VA% 
over their range of products. 
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longer an excess of demand, the rate of inflation will subside perma-
nently when this residue of the previous excess is removed. The pur-
pose of the control System is to give the country a period of enforced 
stability in which expectations, contracts, and behaviour will become 
adapted to the fact that rapid inflation is no longer the prospective 
condition of American life. When that happens controls can be elimin-
ated. 16 
A salient feature of the U.S. controls was that the SV2 per cent pay 
guidelines were generally applicable to ail wage and salary increases — 
barring the specified « exceptions », which are standard components of 
most policies. On the question of « exceptions » to the guidelines the 
Commission disregarded the U.K's experiment with guidelines and pro-
ductivity bargaining and questioned the need for permitting flexible 
guidelines to allow for differential rates of productivity growth among 
industries on the grounds that such flexibility would ( 1 ) conflict with the 
basic économie mechanism through which « productivity gains tend to be 
diffused throughout the entire economy rather than being reflected in 
lasting divergencies in relative wage levels between industries with high 
rates of productivity increase and industries with low ones » and (2) would 
encounter strong résistance from those workers who (justifiably) felt that 
they had been unfairly treated.17 
Most incomes policies quite rightly allowed for exceptions : for 
instance, U.S. and British policies provided for increases above the norm 
where firms needed to attract workers or where wages were particularly 
low, i.e. near the bottom of the economy's wage scale. Paralleling the 1971 
U.S. wage controls during Phase I were price (and rent) restraints which 
prohibited firms from increasing prices to raise profit margins.18 
To obtain public aceeptance of controls and compliance from unions 
and workers generally, most incomes policies include provisions for con-
16 As quoted in the Summary Report, op. cit., p. 49. 
17 Ibid., p. 49. 
18
 Ibid., p. 49. Phase II eliminated certain sellers from the controller's juris-
diction and revised certain pay standards. Increases in prices were permitted only 
if the margin of profit was lowered below the level prevailing when the controls 
were imposed and below the highest average margin realized in any two of the 
firm's last three fiscal years. Thus firms were allowed to raise prices only to the 
extent necessary to maintain the lower of their profit margin before controls were 
introduced or their margin in the base (last three fiscal years period). Firms 
which did not increase their prices had their profit margins subject to control only 
in spécial cases. 
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trolling rents, dividends and other non-labor income (inoluding profes-
sional fées) and stricter régulations regarding business expense déductions 
for tax purposes. In essence thèse were the kinds of comprehensive controls 
the Commission was contemplating in 1969. But, we are told « discussions 
were broken off well before any agreement had been reached even in 
principle. « 19 Unfortunately, no unequivocal reasons hâve been given for 
the breakdown and whether it was labor or management or the govern-
ment(s) (or ail three ?) which refused to co-operate ? One can only 
surmise where the opposition came from, but the lesson to be leamt from 
this expérience may well contain the key for success of any similar agency 
in the future. Was it the view of some that justice and equity would only 
appear to be done ? And what changes to the proposed controls were 
required in order to induce say organized labour and provincial authorities 
to comply ? We are, however, told that those taking part in the explora-
tory discussions on a restraint program felt tbat the country was not yet 
ready for a mandatory incomes policy, and were under no illusions that 
an effective policy could be devised without fédéral and provincial support 
(by way of régulations, fiscal devices or more informai methods of per-
suation). 
Subséquent to the breakdown of discussions the National Conférence 
on Price Stability adopted a compromise measure of self-imposed price 
restraint criteria which required firms to ensure that the revenue gains 
derived from price increases were limited to amounts clearly less than the 
increases in costs that the firms were experiencing. 20 This program of 
price restraint was introduced in 1970. From the outset it was obvious 
that if the program was to stand any chance of success corresponding 
restraint was necessary in the rate at which wages and salaries increased. 
The Commission therefore unilaterally announced an upper six psr cent 
limit on annual earnings. This proposai was honored more often in the 
breach than in the observance, not only in the private sector but in the 
public sector as well. Nevertheless, this short-lived attempt at cost-price 
restraint succeeded (by the second half of 1970) in reducing the rate of 
price increase in Canada to one of the lowest recorded by an industrial 
country that year ; and while some goveraments were non-committal about 
observing the income guideline, some modest réductions in the rate of 
19 Ibid., p. 50. 
20 This requirement, particularly if upheld over a lengthy period, would 
hâve had the effect of reducing returns on capital or the rate of profit. 
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wage and salary increases were also discernable. Unfortunately, this tem-
porary diminuation in the rate of inflation was coupled with an inordinate 
incerase in the level of unemployment which led some critics of incomes 
policies to conclude that if a voluntary system failed so abjectly there was 
less of a case for introducing mandatory controls under the circumstances 
which prevailed at that rime. 
If an effective and équitable incomes policy could hâve been devel-
oped in 1969/70 (particularly one acceptable to labour) and wholehearted 
provincial support obtained then the experiment might hâve been well 
worth the effort given the high stakes and relatively low risk. But events 
at that time make it abundantly clear that what was needed from govern-
ment was a clear statement of the relationship between income policy 
guidelines and broad national objectives. National économie planning (and 
budgeting) would hâve aided the implementation and success of such a 
policy and helped to establish the connection between public interest and 
private action. But in Canada, given the lack of effective co-operation 
between the various levels of governments, efforts to achieve co-ordinated 
décisions and comprehensive économie planning are inhibited. Neverthe-
less, every effort must be made to overcome this obstacle. 
Responsibility for managing the economy lies principally with the 
fédéral government which alone possesses the constitutional authority to 
impose a mandatory incomes policy if such deemed necessary. Why then 
did the central government not act ? European and U.S. expérience sug-
gests that such a policy stands a better chance of success in the face of 
quite serious domestic inflation or balance of payments crises. The latter 
was not an issue in Canada at the time but the former was nearing a 
critical point. But given the fact that most industrial countries quite 
generally regard an incomes policy as an adjunct to demand management 
and as one of the standard devices for controlling inflation and promoting 
high employment and économie growth, it is difficult to understand 
why the fédéral government opted for the alternative policy (frequently 
but unsuccessfully tried in the past) of dampening économie activity by 
deliberate policy actions which, as it once again turned out, led to was-
teful and excessively high levels of unemployment. 
There are indications from elsewhere that the main opposition to 
incomes policies cornes from organized labour — whose views presumably 
are reflected mainly through their union leaders. Empirical studies to test 
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this assertion are needed. 21 In countries such as Sweden (and to a lesser 
extent Holland) enlightened union leaders (aided by government) are 
more likely to advocate such a policy in times of économie crises in the 
knowledge that their members wiil ultimately be the beneficiaries not only 
in terms of maintaining real wages through improved price stability but 
equally important in terms of enabling the authorities to maintain full 
employment, steady économie growth and viable balances of international 
payments. There is bound to be opposition to an incomes policy if the 
guidelines (and exceptions) established are not considered reasonable by 
ail concerned and if divergenoies between wage increases and actual 
earnings are not kept under close surveillance. Equally serions is the 
possibility that undeserved income redistribution may occur under an 
ill-conceived policy which fails to restrain more competitively determined 
wages and priées. Thus acceptance (and compliance) implies gênerai 
agreement among employer s and unions not only of government objectives 
but public récognition of the fact that the guidelines will be fairly applied 
and not lead to spécial advantages to any particular labour group (in the 
form of wage gains) or industrial group (in the form of increased profits) 
especially if thèse would be at the expense of the low paid, unorganized 
workers or those employed in the public sector. Clearly public enlighten-
ment is essential to success, but as ail West European countries which 
hâve experimented with such policies found out this requires a massive 
program in économie éducation. 
More difficult to overcome are those objections to an incomes policy 
on the grounds of prinoiple ; and it is in this context that authorities in 
Canada may hâve to face tougher opposition than their counterparts do 
in Europe. Lacking the high degree of centralization, unionization and 
solidarity présent in the labour movement, say within several of the E.E.C. 
countries, the belief is said to prevail in Canada that an incomes policy 
would infringe on individual, social and political freedoms, and weaken 
(perhaps destroy) the freedom of unions to bargain collectively on behalf 
of their members. Except in times of war, organized labour in Canada has 
always tended to resist any form of government intervention in matters of 
wage détermination. Thus, before authorities can consider imposing a poli-
cy of control it will be necessary to make unions aware of the fact that there 
may be occasions when the alternatives to an incomes policy may be far 
more harmful than temporarily sacrificing the right to negotiai:e wage 
21 A Gallup poil taken in the U.S. in June 1970 reported that 48% of the 
public favored freezing priées and wages at their présent levels as long as the 
Vietnam War lasted. 
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rates and fringe benefits for their members. Unless workers are convinced 
that such temporary controls will work to their and the nation's advantage 
the chances of successfully implementing them are slight. 
Dedication to the principle among union leaders that collective bar-
gaining over wage rates, unhampered by government, is bénéficiai and 
essential to the survival of the institution of unionism is understandable 
in light of employers' belief in the virtues of private enterprise. Such 
dedication and belief gain strong support from those académie econo-
mists who still appear to be committed to the kind of thorough-going 
laissez-faire System as postulated by (the First) Adam Smith. It is im-
probable that this latter group would see any merit in an incomes policy 
whatever the circumstances.22 But they might do well to ponder on Keynes' 
dictum : 
No one can be certain of anything in this âge of flux and change. 
Decaying standards of life at a time when our command over the pro-
duction of material satisfactions is the greatest ever, and a diminishing 
scope for individual décision and choice at a time when more than 
before we should be able to afford thèse satisfactions, are sufficient 
to indicate an underlying contradiction in every départaient of our 
economy. No plan will work for certain in such an epoch. But if 
they palpably fail, then, of course, we and everyone else will try some-
thing différent. 23 
Moreover, it should be remembered that the économie cost of temporarily 
blunting incentives may be far less than the alternative costs of higher 
levels of unemployment and inflation which the 'stop-go' policies of im-
précise demand management hâve brought in the past and are likely to 
bring in the future given the controversy over what constitutes an appro-
priate policy. 
One way of resolving the problem of unemployment is to opt for 
inflation. In the relatively récent past this option was made easier when 
inflation could be kept within reasonable bounds of 2 - 3 per cent per 
annum. But the évidence today suggests that were inflation kept within 
this band then the level of unemployment would probably hâve to be 
allowed to rise to about 5 or 6 per cent — a shockingly wasteful level. 
The fundamental question, therefore, is : is society prepared to accept 
22 But they would be well advised to re-read Keynes' General Theory of Em-
ployment, Interest and Money, particularly Chap. 19, «Changes in Money-Wages, » 
Macmillan, London, 1951, pp. 257-271. 
23 J.M. KEYNES, « The Balance of Payments in the United States, » Economie 
Journal, XVI, No. 222, June 1946, p. 186. 
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higher (indeed accelerating) rates of inflation in return for relatively 
acceptable levels of unemployment ? There is no way of judging the 
temper of the country correctly on this question but a number of authori-
tative studies of the inflation-unemployment « trade-off » problem seem 
to opt (hopefully and perhaps unrealistically) for an unemployment rate 
of 4 - AVi per cent as an intérim measure (with longer term levels reduced 
to 3 per cent), on the assumption that ensuing price rises would be kept 
within reasonable and manageable bounds. If such goals can be achieved 
then the need for an incomes policy does not arise. But given the uncertain 
contributions of demand mangement and supply policies, the wide diversity 
of opinions on how to make thèse instruments more effective, and the 
narrow range of options available to poliey-makers in attempting to achieve 
then stated objectives, the chances of success are questionable. However, 
were the public made more widely aware of the difficulties and com-
plexities involved in attaining the goal, should the need arise public 
opinion might readily swing round to a temporary policy of restraint where 
the probability of success was high. The expérience of other countries in 
this regard suggests that responsibility rests with government to educate 
the public to the need for controls ; and wider acceptability was obtained 
by adoption of imaginative and équitable forms of policies. For instance, 
several noteworthy proposais hâve been advanced whereby increases in 
wages, salaries and non-wage incomes beyond stipulated percentages 
would be subject to a graduated withholding tax (refundable at some 
future date) with the larger the increase in money income beyond this 
percentage the larger the amount of this income withheld. 24 A Avorkable 
and effective tax along thèse lines would keep earnings within ac-ceptable 
bounds and reduce the need for state intervention in the collective bar-
gaining process or in other aspects of income détermination. 
While there is no certainty that the formai introduction of a manda-
tory incomes policy in Canada at some future date will solve the problem 
2 4
 S. WEINTRAUB and H.C. WAELICH, « A Tax Based Incomes Policy, » 
Journal of Economie Issues, June 1971. The authors propose that a surtax be 
levied on the profits of corporations granting wage and salary increases above 
guidelines specified by the government. With labor costs stabilized, prices should 
remain relatively constant with the government acting as a watchdog over wage-
salary transactions only. It is argued that an Incomes Policy of this kind need not 
conflict with Professor Friedman's view that a restrained monetary policy pro-
ceeding within rates of increase in the money supply of about 5 - 8 per cent per 
annum is necessary for économie stability. 
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of persistently high unemployment and inflation, in the light of alternative 
solutions it appears to offer greater prospects of success than conventional 
policies alone and for this reason should be given a thorough trial. A 
possible approach might be to follow the recommendations of the former 
chairman of the British National Board for Prices and Incomes, Mr. 
Aubrey Jones. He suggests that the Government should establish a board 
— along the lines of the National Economie Development Council — 
consisting of labour, management and government représentatives, whose 
function would be to draw up wage-price régulations for both the private 
and public sectors ; thèse régulations would be baeked by sanctions. Com-
panies pledged to price restraint could, at the request of the association 
to which they may belong, be made subject to sanctions, if their wage 
increases exceeded those laid down : the board would be empowered to 
deny them price increases or to enforce a price réduction. In lieu of linking 
wages and salaries to a cost of living index, he suggests that workers should 
be paid an amount of extra money (which would just préserve the living 
standards of the lowest paid workers), but later with inflation under con-
trol the Government could take the more positive step of increasing every-
body's recd income. He also proposes that companies lodge part of their 
retained earnings in the name of their employées in a capital fund managed 
by the unions (in his example the Trades Union Congress), with the help 
of investment experts. Such a scheme, he claims, would remove the 
anomaly that subjects wage-earners under any incomes policy to some 
limitation on the increase of money income, while the capital owner is 
subject to no limit on the appréciation of his capital. ^ 
Setting up a board along the Unes suggested by Aubrey Jones would 
aid the implementation of an incomes policy, and bring improvements in 
the maehinery of wage negotiations. 26 The current diversity of institutions 
25 See A. JONES, «A Policy for Prices and Incomes Now, » Lloyds Bank 
Review, No. 103, January 1972. See also J. SKINNER, Collective Bargaîning and 
Inequality, Fabian Research Séries No. 298, London 1971. The author hère argues 
for the introduction of a statutorily based « capital formation fund », whereby 
unions could gain ownership of capital assets and bring about the redistribution 
of wealth which Governments, through the capital gains tax, restructuring of cor-
poration tax, changes in social security benefits, etc., hâve so far failed to achieve. 
26
 Jones argues that UK's 1960 incomes policy failed because of the muddle 
the Labour government made of its exchange rate policy which obliged it sumul-
taneously to try to keep the rise in real after-tax incomes down to the prevailing 
growth rate of an appallingly low Vi to lVâ per cent a year, and because of the 
government's refusai to take a few critical strikes, choosing instead to pass on 
crucial decision-making on pace-setting claims to less skilled adjudicators than the 
Jones Board. See, A. JONES, The New Inflation, Deutch, London, 1972. 
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for, and accepted practices of, collective bargaining in Canada seems more 
suited to conditions in past décades than to présent circumstances. The 
industrial relations system should be adapted to the quite différent éco-
nomie climate now prevailing, where, (until the unemployment-inflation 
« trade-off » problem is resolved), the basic problems are the avoidance 
of unemployment and provision for a steady and équitable rise in real 
incomes without inflation. 
An affirmative answer to the question whether Canada should try 
to implement an incomes policy should it become necessary at some future 
date does not dépend on the assumption that an attempt to introduce a 
mandatory policy would be free from defects. It rests on the évidence 
that the alternative conventional methods of dealing with the problems 
of unacceptably high levels of unemployment and inflation are (in their 
présent state of évolution) less acceptable simply because the outeome is 
too indeterminate. And after ail the économie cost of implementing a 
temporary incomes policy is unlikely to exceed the cost, in terms of unused 
resources, which alternative approaches seem to offer. 
La Commission des prix et des revenus : rétrospective 
En 1968, l'inflation était fermement enracinée dans l'économie canadienne. À 
l'époque, le livre blanc du gouvernement, qui s'intitulait « Politiques pour la stabi-
lisation des prix », était arrivé à la conclusion que les moyens traditionnels n'étaient 
plus adéquats pour résoudre le conflit entre le maintien d'un haut niveau d'emploi, 
la réduction de l'inflation et le développement soutenu de la croissance économique. 
L'année suivante, on créa la Commission des prix et des revenus pour essayer de 
résoudre ce problème. 
Le mandat de la Commission, tout en étant très vaste, visait essentiellement à 
enquêter sur les causes, l'évolution et les conséquences de l'inflation et à trouver 
les moyens de stabiliser les prix. C'est avec raison qu'elle choisit de confiner ses 
recherches à l'examen des raisons d'une forte inflation et d'un chômage élevé per-
sistants et simultanés au Canada et à la découverte d'une politique des revenus 
susceptible d'atténuer le problème. Elle arriva à la conclusion que la raison principale 
de l'augmentation plutôt rapide des prix et des coûts à partir du milieu de la décennie 
1960 jusqu'à date résidait dans la pression d'une demande prononcée sur la capacité 
de production et sur la main-d'œuvre qui avait suivi la dévaluation du dollar canadien 
en 1962 et l'augmentation subséquente des investissements et des dépenses gouver-
nementales. La question fondamentale qui se posait aux pouvoirs publics, cependant, 
c'était comment freiner l'inflation sans augmenter le chômage, alors qu'on se rendait 
compte qu'il n'existait aucune façon de maîtriser la demande que la population 
accepterait ou approuverait. 
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Les choix qui s'offraient au gouvernement étaient de maintenir et de poursuivre 
sa politique expansionniste et de compter sur le taux de change flottant pour corriger 
l'inflation qui s'ensuivrait ou s'en tenir à la traditionnelle méthode de l'alternance 
d'une politique d'expansion succédant à la politique de contraction, dite politique de 
« l'arrêt-marche », qu'on avait utilisée dans le passé avec un succès plutôt mitigé. 
La Commission s'aperçut que l'un et l'autre choix étaient inacceptables pour le public 
et que ni l'un ni l'autre ne signifierait un apport net pour la société. Restait la pos-
sibilité d'essayer de réduire le niveau critique du chômage (auquel coût et auquel 
prix les augmentations ont tendance à s'accélérer) en poursuivant des programmes 
de main-d'œuvre appropriés qui aideraient à équilibrer l'offre et la demande de tra-
vail, même si quelques aspects de ces programmes, tels que la hausse des prestations 
de l'assurance-chômage et du bien-être social ainsi que du salaire minimum, pouvaient 
avoir un effet contraire. Finalement, le gouvernement opta pour une politique 
impopulaire en essayant de stabiliser la croissance de la demande à un taux assez 
bas pour restaurer la stabilité des coûts et des prix. Le taux d'inflation diminua, 
mais le chômage s'éleva à un niveau inacceptable. 
La Commission ne blâme pas ou ne blâme que bien peu, en tout cas, les 
syndicats et les entreprises pour la façon dont ils ont usé de leur pouvoir de mar-
chandage, bien qu'elle attribue un certain mérite aux politiques qui favorisent la 
concurrence par la suppression des pratiques restrictives en matière de commerce 
et de travail. Elle reconnaît que le moyen d'avoir une économie saine dépend de la 
maîtrise de la demande effective, mais considérant les controverses autour de l'im-
portance relative des mesures fiscales et monétaires, le réglage et l'amplitude de 
leurs effets, les conséquences du taux de change, elle conclut qu'il ne serait pas 
réaliste de s'en remettre uniquement aux politiques de la demande générale si l'on 
veut atteindre les objectifs déclarés d'un plein emploi normal, de la stabilité des 
prix et d'une croissance économique constante. Pour cette raison donc, une politique 
des revenus temporaire mais obligatoire devrait être envisagée si les circonstances 
la justifient et si les provinces, les syndicats et le patronat sont prêts à coopérer. La 
Commission reconnaît que ses efforts en vue d'inciter les travailleurs à se soumettre 
à son indicateur unilatéralement fixé d'une augmentation annuelle de six pour cent 
par année des taux de salaire (en même temps que l'industrie imposerait son propre 
contrôle des prix) étaient voués à un échec parce qu'il s'agissait de volontariat. Des 
tentatives antérieures en vue d'obtenir la permission d'imposer des contrôles des prix 
et des salaires rigoureux n'ont pas eu de succès, mais il n'est pas donné de raisons 
explicites de cet échec. Le genre de contrôles que la Commission envisageait étaient 
ceux qui, subséquemment, furent appliqués (en trois phases) aux États-Unis à partir 
d'août 1971. Ainsi, il se peut que si l'inflation (et la crise de la balance des paie-
ments) requiert une attention sérieuse dans l'avenir, le Canada peut possiblement 
considérer l'application d'un programme de restriction selon la formule américaine 
tel qu'il était préconisé par la maintenant défunte Commission. 
